But probability arguments in this kinds of way really aren't much more than shorthand for "no reasonable person believes [improbable idea]," for three reasons: 1) It's not really calculable. Unless, of course, you happen to have surveyed all possible worlds with the exception of ours, and happen to have found, on balance, that there is definitely not a god in most of them. 2) It's not strictly a disprovable claim, nor is it strictly strongly linked to atheism. The statement "there probably isn't a god" doesn't necessarily have a truth value that changes if there happens to be a god. (Which is why you'll find avowed theists like Kierkegaard who seem to presuppose that god's existence is, by nature, improbable and that's why you believe). Similarly, an atheist could be perfectly happy with the claim that "there probably is a god, but it's actually the case that there isn't one." In the same sense that we can be generally happy with the claim that "human evolution is fundamentally improbable but nonetheless something that occured." 3) The entire question is weighted towards whatever conceptual framework you happen to be working in (which will most commonly rely on some kind of belief somewhere). The teapot example, for instance, works because most people don't really believe that space is populated by teapots. But if you happened to have a (perfectly functional) physical theory that included having a space rich in floating teapots, which works well enough to let you build a working anti-gravity generator or something, then chances are good that you will be inclined to believe that a person who thinks the existence of your teapots improbable is mad, regardless of whether such teapots "actually" exist or not.
This is just because "probably no God" arguments bug me a bit...
1) It's not really calculable. Unless, of course, you happen to have surveyed all possible worlds with the exception of ours, and happen to have found, on balance, that there is definitely not a god in most of them.
2) It's not strictly a disprovable claim, nor is it strictly strongly linked to atheism. The statement "there probably isn't a god" doesn't necessarily have a truth value that changes if there happens to be a god. (Which is why you'll find avowed theists like Kierkegaard who seem to presuppose that god's existence is, by nature, improbable and that's why you believe). Similarly, an atheist could be perfectly happy with the claim that "there probably is a god, but it's actually the case that there isn't one." In the same sense that we can be generally happy with the claim that "human evolution is fundamentally improbable but nonetheless something that occured."
3) The entire question is weighted towards whatever conceptual framework you happen to be working in (which will most commonly rely on some kind of belief somewhere). The teapot example, for instance, works because most people don't really believe that space is populated by teapots. But if you happened to have a (perfectly functional) physical theory that included having a space rich in floating teapots, which works well enough to let you build a working anti-gravity generator or something, then chances are good that you will be inclined to believe that a person who thinks the existence of your teapots improbable is mad, regardless of whether such teapots "actually" exist or not.