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I saw "The Prestige" recently (after ![[livejournal.com profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/external/lj-userinfo.gif)
distantcam bugging me to see it for ages) and it was awesome. What follows are some VERY spoilery thoughts which you SHOULD NOT READ if you haven't seen the film. They're not about the film per se, but were inspired by a major plot point.
*SPOILER* *SPOILER* *SPOILER* *SPOILER*
*SPOILER*
So, in the film Danton has set up his stage so that a copy of him is made, and then immediately afterwards one of the versions of him is killed. At the end of the film he says "I never knew if I was going to be the one who lived or the one who died".
distantcam and I got into a discussion about whether or not this statement makes any sense. Unfortunately it was very late so I can't remember distantcam's argument well enough to do it justice but I'll try, and will let him explain himself better in the comments if he likes.
So. Just before the lever is switched we have one Danton, lets call him DantonA. He thinks to himself "I wonder if I will be the one who lives or the one who dies". Just afterwards we have DantonB1 and DantonB2, both of whom are exact duplicates of DantonA and have all his memories. DantonB1 appears in exactly the same position as DantonA, and is immediately killed. DantonB2 appears about 100m away, and goes on to become the only Danton (for the next 24 hours or so anyway)
distantcam's argument: (I think) by definition, the one who survives is, and always was DantonA, but he had a 50% chance of being DantonB1 and dying. Beyond that I don't 100% remember it.
My argument: every moment the person we are (DantonA) is destroyed, and a new almost identical person (DantonB) is created in the same place. We plan our lives as if we are the same person as our future selves, and make that future self's happiness a priority, but strictly speaking we are not them. However we are "the same person as them" in a more broad, commonsense sense. In my opinion, DantonB1 and DantonB2 are not the same person as each other, but depending on how you think about it they are either both or neither the same person as DantonA. (yes, usually "the same person as" is commutative, but that's because usually our notion of self doesn't have to deal with exact duplicates)
First let us consider what would happen if there was no cloning device, and Danton simply died after pulling the lever. DantonA thinks "I wonder if I will die?" and then turns into DantonB, thinks "crap, yep, going to drown", then drowns. In one sense the person who is DantonA doesn't drown because at that point there is no DantonA, only DantonB. But in the usual way of thinking about things, DantonA=DantonB, and so has a 100% chance of being "the one who drowns".
Now consider the world of the film. DantonA thinks "I wonder if I will die?". He then splits into DantonB1 and DantonB2. DantonB1 thinks "crap, I am the one who drowns" and drowns. DantonB2 thinks "Yay! Not the one who drowns!". They are both equally right, they both remember being DantonA and both think of themselves as being the same person as DantonA, only slightly in the future. Thus either we think of DantonA (the one who thought "I wonder if I will die?") as being already destroyed and so the question is meaningless, or they are both "the same person" as DantonA and so a person who is DantonA (but slightly in the future) always drowns, and a person who is DantonA (but slightly in the future) always lives.
An example I think illustrates my point: suppose neither of them died, but DantonB1 appeared the the left and DantonB2 to the right. Before pulling the lever DantonA thinks "I wonder if I will appear on the right or the left?". A moment later, DantonB1 appears and thinks "Ooh, I appeared on the left" while DantonB2 appears and thinks "Ooh, I appeared on the right". Which of them is the same person as DantonA? Does it make sense for Danton to ask himself "Will I appear on the left or the right?"? I say no, and that the question is equivalent to "Will I drown or not?".
Third POV I just thought of: DantonA=DantonB1, since they are physically continuous. Therefore DantonA, the person who thinks "I wonder if I will drown?", has an 100% chance of dying, and the surviving copy DantonB2 is just a clone who thinks he is DantonA (only slightly in the future) but is actually a totally different person.
So, make any sense to people? Or too philosophical and tl;dr? Any opinions?
distantcam bugging me to see it for ages) and it was awesome. What follows are some VERY spoilery thoughts which you SHOULD NOT READ if you haven't seen the film. They're not about the film per se, but were inspired by a major plot point.*SPOILER* *SPOILER* *SPOILER* *SPOILER*
*SPOILER*
So, in the film Danton has set up his stage so that a copy of him is made, and then immediately afterwards one of the versions of him is killed. At the end of the film he says "I never knew if I was going to be the one who lived or the one who died".
distantcam and I got into a discussion about whether or not this statement makes any sense. Unfortunately it was very late so I can't remember distantcam's argument well enough to do it justice but I'll try, and will let him explain himself better in the comments if he likes.So. Just before the lever is switched we have one Danton, lets call him DantonA. He thinks to himself "I wonder if I will be the one who lives or the one who dies". Just afterwards we have DantonB1 and DantonB2, both of whom are exact duplicates of DantonA and have all his memories. DantonB1 appears in exactly the same position as DantonA, and is immediately killed. DantonB2 appears about 100m away, and goes on to become the only Danton (for the next 24 hours or so anyway)
distantcam's argument: (I think) by definition, the one who survives is, and always was DantonA, but he had a 50% chance of being DantonB1 and dying. Beyond that I don't 100% remember it.My argument: every moment the person we are (DantonA) is destroyed, and a new almost identical person (DantonB) is created in the same place. We plan our lives as if we are the same person as our future selves, and make that future self's happiness a priority, but strictly speaking we are not them. However we are "the same person as them" in a more broad, commonsense sense. In my opinion, DantonB1 and DantonB2 are not the same person as each other, but depending on how you think about it they are either both or neither the same person as DantonA. (yes, usually "the same person as" is commutative, but that's because usually our notion of self doesn't have to deal with exact duplicates)
First let us consider what would happen if there was no cloning device, and Danton simply died after pulling the lever. DantonA thinks "I wonder if I will die?" and then turns into DantonB, thinks "crap, yep, going to drown", then drowns. In one sense the person who is DantonA doesn't drown because at that point there is no DantonA, only DantonB. But in the usual way of thinking about things, DantonA=DantonB, and so has a 100% chance of being "the one who drowns".
Now consider the world of the film. DantonA thinks "I wonder if I will die?". He then splits into DantonB1 and DantonB2. DantonB1 thinks "crap, I am the one who drowns" and drowns. DantonB2 thinks "Yay! Not the one who drowns!". They are both equally right, they both remember being DantonA and both think of themselves as being the same person as DantonA, only slightly in the future. Thus either we think of DantonA (the one who thought "I wonder if I will die?") as being already destroyed and so the question is meaningless, or they are both "the same person" as DantonA and so a person who is DantonA (but slightly in the future) always drowns, and a person who is DantonA (but slightly in the future) always lives.
An example I think illustrates my point: suppose neither of them died, but DantonB1 appeared the the left and DantonB2 to the right. Before pulling the lever DantonA thinks "I wonder if I will appear on the right or the left?". A moment later, DantonB1 appears and thinks "Ooh, I appeared on the left" while DantonB2 appears and thinks "Ooh, I appeared on the right". Which of them is the same person as DantonA? Does it make sense for Danton to ask himself "Will I appear on the left or the right?"? I say no, and that the question is equivalent to "Will I drown or not?".
Third POV I just thought of: DantonA=DantonB1, since they are physically continuous. Therefore DantonA, the person who thinks "I wonder if I will drown?", has an 100% chance of dying, and the surviving copy DantonB2 is just a clone who thinks he is DantonA (only slightly in the future) but is actually a totally different person.
So, make any sense to people? Or too philosophical and tl;dr? Any opinions?
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Alternatively:
http://www.xkcd.org/c220.html
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*ponders turning that comic into an icon for this sort of post*
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He saw the duplicate as Not Him - he was Him, anyone else was Other. This is in striking contrast with Borden, obviously, but that's by the by.
Because of this, Danton didn't really grasp the continuity - he didn't consider what he was doing as suicide, because it wasn't *him* anymore.
This was clear from the first experiment with Tesla's device, where he kept the pistol to hand for exactly this reason.
So, to him, there was always the possibility that *He* would be the one in the box, and the Other would walk out alive.
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This is after the fact. Going in, it was 50-50.
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And people who believe physical continuity is important tend to choose shuttles over teleportation devices.
My me of yesterday is dead, but no more so than the man who married my wife, or the person who promised to pay me in a month if I turn up to work several days a week in the interim.
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Yes, you're exactly right - but Danton didn't grasp the same-ness of the clone, and considered continuity of thought to be the defining factor of Him. I didn't appear to grasp that both versions possessed that quality, and didn't leave a clone living long enough to find out.
So, going in, he thought he was either going to die, or survive, and didn't appear to get that it would be both.
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"*He* didn't appear to grasp..."
Self-issues of my own, there, apparently. :)
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But yes, I think you're on to something there. His mental model seemed to be something along the lines of "a clone is created, then the one of us is selected at random for transportation."
I'm glad the film didn't appear to be going out of it's way to claim Danton's world view was necessarily prescriptive (cf comments below about him being off his rocker :).
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The self of nature...
From DantonB2 (the survivor) point of view he survived, while the other Danton(B1) died. So from his (B2) point of view he lucked out on a 50-50 gamble and didn't die.
So, ignoring all other viewpoints, from DantonB2's point of view it was a 50-50 gamble that he won.
Now I understand that from an external viewpoint the odds are 100% for both because two Dantons are made. But I was just arguing from DantonB2's point because it's from that viewpoint that the comment was made. From his viewpoint he is the individual who made it through the process.
Completely off his rocker though.
Re: The self of nature...
Oh, yes, I don't think anyone is disputing that :)
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Also I remember hearing that in the book the Tesla machine couldn't create a living duplicate and that all the clones were dead from the beginning. It may have been something slightly more existential in the sense that the one in the machine always died because two dupicates could "live" in the same universe. Has anyone actually read the book here?
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Huh, that's interesting about the book (no, haven't read it). Sounds like a whole different kind of creepy, but it does remove the "who is the "real" Danton?" question :)